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
To transcend the current debates about whether participation in the informal sector is a result 
of informal workers “exclusion” or their voluntary “exit” from the formal sector, the aim of 
this paper is to propose and evaluate the existence of a dual informal labour market composed 
of an exitdriven “upper tier” and exclusiondriven “lowertier” of informal workers.    
 
	

To do this, data from a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 27,563 facetoface interviews 
across the European Union is reported.  
 

The finding is that in the European Union, there is a dual informal labour market with those 
participating in the informal sector due to their exclusion from the formal sector being half the 
number of those doing so to voluntarily exit the formal sector. Using a logistic regression 
analysis, the exclusiondriven “lower tier” is identified as significantly more likely to be 
populated by the unemployed and those living in EastCentral Europe and the exitdriven 
“upper tier” by those with few financial difficulties and living in Nordic nations.  
 


The results reveal the need not only to transcend either/or debates about whether participants 
in the informal sector are universally exclusion or exitdriven, and to adopt a both/and 
approach that recognises a dual informal labour market composed of an exitdriven upper tier 
and exclusiondriven lower tier, but also for wider research on the relative sizes of these two 
tiers in individual countries and other global regions, along with which groups populate these 
tiers.  
 


This is the first evaluation of the internal dualism of the informal sector in the European 
Union.  
 

informal economy; shadow economy; dual economy; European Union. 
 
 


 
The informal sector is now recognised to be an extensive and persistent feature of economies 
across the world, which is equivalent to some 31% of global GDP (Schneider and Williams, 
2013), and 60% of the global workforce having their main employment in the informal sector 
(Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009). When explaining participation in this burgeoning sphere, 
commentators have largely adopted either a structuralist perspective that views participants as 
pushed into working in the informal sector due to their “exclusion” from state benefits and the 
circuits of the modern economy (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Taiwo, 2013) or a view that 
informal workers voluntarily “exit” the formal economy, with neoliberals depicting this as a 
Page 1 of 15 Journal of Economic Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Economic Studies
2 
 
rational economic decision (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Maloney, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007) 
and institutionalists representing them more as social actors (Cross, 2000; Gerxhani, 2004; 
Snyder, 2004). Rather than depict informal workers as either universally exit or 
exclusiondriven, however, the aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate the validity of 
viewing the informal sector as a dual informal labour market composed of an exitdriven 
“upper tier” and exclusiondriven “lowertier” of informal workers. Until now, empirical 
evaluations of whether the informal sector is comprised of such a dual informal labour market 
are notable by their absence. To start to fill this gap therefore, a survey of participants’ 
reasons for working in the informal sector in the European Union is here reported. 
 To commence, a brief review is provided of the competing explanations that view the 
informal sector to be a product of either exclusion from the circuits of the modern economy or 
their voluntary exit from the formal sector, followed by a review of the literature that has 
hypothesised the internal dualism of the informal sector. Secondly, and to begin to evaluate 
the validity of viewing the informal sector as comprising a dual informal labour market, a 
survey of European Union citizens regarding their participation in the informal sector and 
their motives will be outlined and thirdly, the results will be reported. This will reveal that 
participation is the result of neither purely exit nor purely exclusion but instead, that some 
conduct such endeavour for exit and others for exclusion rationales, thus revealing the validity 
of viewing the informal sector as a dual informal labour market. Using a logistic regression 
analysis, the groups of informal worker significantly more likely to operate in the 
exclusiondriven “lower tier” and exitdriven “upper tier” in the European Union are then 
identified. The outcome in the final section is a call for a shift from an either/or to a both/and 
approach that recognises a dual informal labour market, and for wider research on the relative 
sizes of these two tiers in nations and other global regions, along with which groups populate 
these tiers. 
 To define the informal sector, three types of definitions have been used, namely 
enterprise, activity and jobbased definitions (see ILO, 2013). Enterprisebased definitions 
differentiate between registered and unregistered enterprises. Although relevant in developing 
countries, this is less relevant in the European Union, since most informal economic activity is 
conducted by registered enterprises that operate partially in the informal sector (Williams, 
2009; Williams and Padmore, 2013). Jobsbased definitions, meanwhile, are also less relevant 
in Europe because the formal/informal jobs binary is brought into question by the existence of 
formal employees employed by formal employers who received a declared wage but also an 
additional undeclared (“envelope”) wage (Horodnic, 2016; Williams and Padmore, 2013). 
Throughout this paper, therefore, and reflecting both the Eurobarometer survey and scholarly 
literature, the informal sector is defined using an activitybased definition as those paid 
activities not declared to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes but 
which are legal in all other respects (BahmaniOskooee, 1999; European Commission, 2007; 
OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014). If activities differ in additional ways to work in the formal 
sector, then this activity is not part of the informal sector. If the goods and/or services traded 
are illegal (e.g., illegal drugs) for example, then it is part of the wider “criminal” economy 
rather than the informal sector, and taken together, this criminal and informal activity is often 
referred to as the nonobserved economy (Eurostat, 2014). If the activity is unpaid, 
meanwhile, then it is part of the separate unpaid economy (Dessing, 2004; Gang and 
Gangopadhyay, 1990; McCrohan and Sugrue, 2001; Quintano and Mazzocchi, 2015; 
Williams, 2009a; Williams and Round, 2011; Williams and Horodnic, 2016). In practice, 
however, there are some blurred boundaries, such as when inkind favours or gifts are 
involved. In this paper, inkind favours and gifts are not included since many authorities do 
not require them to be declared for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes.  
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During the twentieth century, the widelyheld belief was that economic activity would 
naturally and inevitably move into the formal sector and that the informal sector was small 
and gradually disappearing. The continuing existence of the informal sector in modern 
economies thus represented “underdevelopment”, “traditionalism” and “backwardness” 
whilst the emergent formal economy represented “development”, “advancement” and 
“progress” (Bairoch, 1973; Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 1959). Over the past decade or so, however, 
numerous studies reveal that the informal sector is enduring, extensive and expanding in the 
global economy (Bose et al, 2012; Carvaial, 2015; ILO, 2013; Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009; 
Loureriro et al., 2013; Williams, 2014, 2015). To explain this, until now, commentators have 
largely adopted one of two broad perspectives. Here, each is briefly reviewed in turn 
 






Recognising the widespread persistence and even growth of the informal sector, a group of 
structuralist commentators have depicted such endeavour as a byproduct of the advent of an 
increasingly deregulated global economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Slavnic, 
2010). On the one hand, the informal sector is seen to directly result from employers reducing 
costs by subcontracting production to this realm, such as to people who might have been 
former employees who now engage in “false selfemployment” for one supplier only (Gallin, 
2001; Portes and Haller, 2004; Portes and Roberts, 2005). On the other hand, it is viewed as 
an absorber of surplus labour for those excluded from the formal labour market. Those of no 
use to capitalism are no longer maintained as a reserve army of labour but, instead, are 
decanted into the informal sector. Informal work is therefore extensive in excluded 
populations where the formal sector is weak since its role is to act as a substitute. It is 
undertaken by those doing so out of necessity as a survival tactic (Arbex et al., 2015; Castells 
and Portes, 1989; Sassen, 1997). 
 From this perspective, jobs in the informal sector are seen to exist at the bottom of a 
hierarchy of types of employment and are akin to “downgraded labour” with its participants 
receiving few benefits, low wages and with poor working conditions (Castells and Portes, 
1989; Gallin, 2001; European Commission, 2016). The informal sector thus provides 
incomeearning opportunities for those excluded from the formal sector, and is a primary 
means of maintaining a low cost of living by providing cheaper goods and services than 
would otherwise be the case (Nelson and Bruijn, 2005; Tokman, 2001).   
 






 
For others, participating in the informal sector is the result of a decision to voluntarily “exit” 
the formal sector, rather than a product of their involuntary exclusion. On the one hand, this is 
argued from a neoliberal perspective where informal sector workers are viewed as making a 
rational economic decision to exit the formal economy (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Maloney, 2004; 
Perry and Maloney, 2007). Engaging in informal sector is consequently a rational economic 
strategy pursued by workers whose spirit is stifled by stateimposed institutional constraints. 
It is a populist reaction to overregulation. As such, engaging in the informal economy is 
asserted to offer potential benefits not found in formal economy, including flexible hours, job 
training, ease of entry to the labour force, opportunity for economic independence, better 
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wages and avoidance of taxes and inefficient government regulation (Maloney, 2004; 
Packard, 2007). 
On the other hand, the view that the informal sector results from a decision to 
voluntarily exit the formal sector is argued from a poststructuralist perspective where 
informal sector workers are viewed as social actors (Cross, 2000; Gerxhani, 2004; Snyder, 
2004). This is inspired by a small tributary of thought deriving from institutional theory which 
views informal work as illegal but socially legitimate endeavour that arises due to formal 
institutional failings that result in the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions not 
being in symmetry with the norms, values and beliefs that constitute the informal institutions 
(Webb , 2009; Williams and Horodnic, 2015). When there is symmetry between formal 
and informal institutions, informal work only occurs unintentionally such as due to a lack of 
awareness of the laws and regulations. When there is institutional asymmetry however, the 
result is more informal work. Indeed, the greater the degree of asymmetry, the greater is the 
level of informal work (Williams and Shahid, 2016; Williams et al., 2016).  
 





  
 
For most commentators, these exit and exclusion perspectives have been largely treated as an 
either/or choice and therefore as mutually exclusive, with the informal sector depicted as 
taking place according to a single universal “logic” (De Soto, 2001; Snyder, 2004). However, 
a small literature has sought to transcend this crude depiction of the informal sector as 
universally caused by exit or universally caused by exclusion. As Perry and Maloney (2007: 
2) point out, “These two lenses, focusing, respectively, on informality driven by exclusion 
from state benefits and on voluntary exit decisions resulting from private costbenefit 
calculations, are complementary rather than competing analytical frameworks”. Based on this 
recognition that some engaged in the informal sector may be exitdriven and others 
exclusiondriven, an internal dualism of the informal sector has been recognised. As Fields 
(1990, 2005) argues for example, a dual informal labour market exists composed of an 
exitdriven “upper tier” and an exclusiondriven “lower tier” of informal workers.  
 Until now, however, although it has been asserted that exitdriven informal workers 
will be prevalent in developed economies and exclusiondriven informal workers in 
developing countries (Gërxhani, 2004; Maloney, 2004), empirical evaluations of the ratio of 
exitdriven to exclusiondriven participants in the informal sector in different populations 
have been so far notable by their absence. Moreover, although some have argued that 
exclusion motives will be more prevalent in relatively deprived populations and exit in 
relatively affluent groups (Gurtoo and Williams, 2009), no empirical evaluations have been 
conducted of the groups of informal worker significantly more likely to operate in the 
exclusiondriven “lower tier” and exitdriven “upper tier” are population groups. To start to 
fill this gap, therefore, a survey of participants’ reasons for working in the informal sector in 
the European Union is here reported so as to identify firstly, the ratio of exclusion to 
exitdriven informal workers and secondly, the groups of informal worker significantly more 
likely to operate in the exclusiondriven “lower tier” and exitdriven “upper tier” in the 
European Union. 


 	



To evaluate the validity of conceptualising the informal sector in the European Union as a 
dual informal labour market along with the ratio of informal workers in the exitdriven “upper 
tier” and exclusiondriven “lowertier” and the populations significantly more likely to be 
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found in these two tiers, we here report the results of special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, 
which involved 27,563 facetoface interviews conducted in April and May 2013 across the 
28 member states of the European Union (EU28). This interviewed individuals aged 15 years 
and older in the national language based on a multistage random (probability) sampling 
methodology, with the number of interviews varying from 500 in smaller countries to 1,500 in 
larger nations. The methodology ensures that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality 
size, each country as well as each level of sample is representative in proportion to its 
population size. Therefore, for the univariate analysis we employed sample weighting, as 
recommended in both the wider literature (Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) and 
the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the multivariate 
analysis however, debate exists over whether a weighting scheme should be used (Pfefferman, 
1993; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994). Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, we 
decided not to use the weighting scheme. 
The facetoface interview schedule adopted a gradual approach to the more sensitive 
questions, firstly asking questions about the participants’ attitudes towards the informal sector 
and having established rapport, questions on their purchase of goods and services in the 
informal sector along with their reasons for doing so and finally, questions on their 
participation as workers in the informal sector. Participants were first asked ‘Apart from a 
regular employment, have you yourself carried out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 
months?’. If so, they were asked “What were the reasons for doing these activities 
undeclared?’ among the following: The person(s) who acquired it insisted on the 
nondeclaration; Bureaucracy or red tape for a regular economic activity is too complicated; 
Bureaucracy or red tape for minor or occasional activities is too complicated; You could not 
find a regular job; You were able to ask for a higher fee for your work; Both parties benefited 
from it; Taxes and\ or social security contributions are too high; Working undeclared is 
common practice in your region or sector of activity so there is no real alternative; The State 
does not do anything for you, so why should you pay taxes; It is difficult to live on social 
welfare benefits; You have no other means of inc me.” 
To analyse firstly, who works in the informal sector and secondly, the individual 
characteristics of those selecting different motives for working in the informal sector, a 
logistic regression analysis provides a suitable technique. The following variables are 
analysed.  
 
	
	
• 		

dichotomous variable recorded value 1 for persons who answered 
“yes” to the question “Apart from a regular employment, have you yourself carried out 
any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months?”, and recorded value 0 otherwise.
•  	 	  	 a dichotomous variable recorded 
value 1 for persons who reported at least one “exit” motive for working in the informal 
sector (i.e., bureaucracy or red tape for a regular economic activity is too complicated; 
bureaucracy or red tape for minor or occasional activities is too complicated; you were 
able to ask for a higher fee for your work; both parties benefited from it; taxes and\or 
social security contributions are too high; the State does not do anything for you, so why 
should you pay taxes) and none of the ‘exclusion’ motives, and recorded value 0 
otherwise. 
• 	   	 	  	  a dichotomous variable 
recorded value 1 for persons who reported at least one “exclusion” motive (i.e., the person 
who acquired it insisted on the nondeclaration; you could not find a regular job; working 
undeclared is common practice in your region or sector of activity so there is no real 
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alternative; it is difficult to live on social welfare benefits; you have no other means of 
income) and none of the ‘exit’ motives, and recorded value 0 otherwise. 
• 
			 a dichotomous variable recorded 
value 1 for persons who reported at least one “exit” motive and at least one “exclusion” 
motive, and recorded value 0 otherwise. 
 
 	
	
	
• ! ": constructed index of selfreported tolerance towards tax noncompliance, 
where 1 represents higher tax morale and 10 lower tax morale.  
• #	
: a dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males. 
• $: a continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent. 
• : a categorical variable for the marital status of the respondent with value 1 
for married/ remarried individuals or living with partner, value 2 for singles, value 3 for 
those separated or divorced, and value 4 for widowed and for other form of marital status. 
• %	: a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation with value 1 
for unemployed, value 2 for selfemployed, value 3 for managers, value 4 for other white 
collars, value 5 for manual workers, value 6 for house persons, value 7 for retired 
individuals, and value 8 for students. 
•  "	 : a categorical variable for the respondent difficulties in paying 
bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for occasionally, and 
value 3 for almost never/ never. 
• & '() " 	 *	 
: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 2 for 
two persons, value 3 for 3 persons or more. 
• +
	: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
• $: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for rural 
area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large town. 
• ,	: a categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with value 1 for 
EastCentral Europe, value 2 for Western Europe, value 3 for Southern Europe, and value 
4 for Nordic Nations. 
We kept in the analysis only the individuals for which data on each and every independent 
variable is available. 
 Before reporting the results, nevertheless, the reliability of the data needs to be briefly 
discussed, especially given the sensitive subject matter involved. The finding is that in 93% of 
the interviews conducted, the interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation from the 
participant and in 7% of the cases the cooperation was average. Cooperation was asserted to 
be bad in only 1% of cases. Given this, attention can turn to an analysis of the results. 
 
!
  
 
Do participants work in the informal sector due to exclusion rationales or due to exit 
rationales? Table 1 reveals that 24% of participants do so for purely exclusion rationales, 45% 
for purely exit reasons and 31% for a mixture of both exclusion and exit rationales. 
Participants, therefore, do not engage in the informal sector purely for either exit or exclusion 
rationales. Rather, there is an internal dualism of the informal sector, with some engaged in 
the informal sector being exitdriven, others exclusiondriven and yet others driven by a 
mixture of both motives. In the European Union as a whole, those participating in the 
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informal sector for purely exclusion rationales are half the number of those doing so for 
purely exit rationales.    
  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is important to recognise, however, that the weight given to exit and exclusion is not 
uniform across the EU28. To see this, member states are here grouped into four EU regions: 
Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and 
the UK); Eastern and Central Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia); Southern Europe (Cyprus, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal), and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland; 
Sweden). Table 1 reveals that exclusion rationales are more common in Southern Europe and 
EastCentral Europe but less common in Nordic nations and Western Europe. Indeed, in 
Southern Europe, there is a 2:1 ratio of those purely exclusiondriven compared with those 
purely exitdriven, whilst the inverse is the case in Nordic nations where a 6.8:1 ratio exists 
between those purely exitdriven and those purely exclusiondriven, whilst this is 3.6:1 in 
Western Europe. The relative sizes of the exitdriven upper tier and exclusiondriven lower 
tier, therefore, significantly vary in different European regions.  
 To analyse firstly, who works in the informal sector in the European Union and 
secondly, the characteristics of the informal workers who operate in the exitdriven upper tier 
and exclusiondriven lower tier, Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis. 
Starting with who participates in the informal sector in the EU28, model 1 shows that men, 
younger citizens and those holding a lower tax morality are significantly more likely to do so. 
Compared with unemployed people, those in employment (but not those in selfemployment) 
are less likely to work in the informal sector, and so too are those not facing difficulties in 
paying bills less likely to work informally compared with those who face such difficulties 
most of the time, and those living in larger households. This is in line with previous studies 
analysing informal workers (Williams and Padmore, 2013; Williams, 2014; Williams and 
Horodnic 2015, 2016). Compared with those living in EastCentral Europe, those living in 
Southern Europe are less likely to work in the informal sector, although those living in Nordic 
nations are more likely to work in the informal sector. Previous studies reveal that although 
participation rates are higher in Nordic nations, much of the informal work smallscale 
oneoff activity conducted for close social relations, whilst in Southern and EastCentral 
Europe, informal work is more commonly waged work conducted on a recurrent basis 
(Williams and Horodnic, 2016).  
 Turning to the characteristics of the informal workers who operate in the exitdriven 
upper tier and exclusiondriven lower tier, model 2 reveals that those participating in the 
exitdriven “upper tier” are significantly more likely to be those who never or almost never 
have difficulties in paying bills and those living in Nordic nations. Participants who are 
statistically less likely to engage in the informal sector due to voluntary exit rationales are the 
unemployed, those single and living with partners, and those living in Southern Europe. 
Meanwhile, and as model 3 displays, those participating in the exclusiondriven “lower tier” 
are significantly more likely to be unemployed people rather than the employed and 
selfemployed, and that compared with those living in EastCentral Europe, those living in 
Nordic nations are significantly less likely to participate in the informal sector for involuntary 
exclusion rationales.  
 Those significantly less likely to cite a combination of exclusion and exit rationales, 
moreover, and as model 4 reveals, are the selfemployed, managers, white collars, manual 
workers, retired persons and students, and so too are those who never or almost never face 
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difficulties in paying bills. Meanwhile, those single and living with partners are more likely to 
cite these mixed reasons compared with those who are married and/or remarried. No 
statistically significant difference exists between EU regions, however, in the propensity to 
cite mixed rationales for engaging in the informal sector. 
 
"

 
To evaluate whether a dual informal labour market exists composed of an exitdriven “upper 
tier” and exclusiondriven “lowertier” of informal workers, this paper has reported data from 
a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 27,563 facetoface interviews across the European 
Union. The finding is that in the European Union, such a dual informal labour market exists 
with those in the exclusiondriven lower tier being half the number of those in the exitdriven 
upper tier, although the ratio of exit to exclusiondriven informal workers significantly varies 
in different European regions. In Southern Europe, there is a 2:1 ratio of those purely 
exclusiondriven compared with those purely exitdriven, whilst conversely, in Nordic nations 
and Western Europe, a 6.8:1 ratio and 3.6: 1 ratio respectively exists between those purely 
exitdriven and those purely exclusiondriven. Reporting a logistic regression analysis for the 
European Union as a whole, moreover, the exclusiondriven “lower tier” is identified as 
significantly more likely to be populated by the unemployed and those living in EastCentral 
Europe and the exitdriven “upper tier” by those with few financial difficulties and living in 
Nordic nations.  
These findings thus display the need to transcend the existing either/or debates about 
whether participants in the informal sector are exclusion or exitdriven. Instead, there is a 
need to adopt a both/and approach that recognises the existence of internal dualism within the 
informal sector; a dual informal labour market exists composed of an exitdriven upper tier 
and exclusiondriven lower tier. What is now required is for wider research to be conducted 
on the relative sizes of these two tiers in other global regions, along with which groups 
populate these tiers. In sum, if this paper thus stimulates a move beyond the current either/or 
debates and the advent of a both/and approach that recognises the internal dualism within the 
informal sector, then one of the intentions of this paper will have been achieved. If this then 
results in wider research to identify the relative size of the two tiers of the dual informal 
labour market in particular nations and other global regions, along with the groups populating 
these tiers, then it will have achieved its fuller intention. The tentative suggestion of this study 
is that wealthier population groups (i.e. which in Europe refers to those living in more affluent 
EU regions and having fewer or no financial difficulties) are more likely to be involved in 
informal work out of choice (i.e., exit motives) whilst other population groups are involved in 
informal work as a coping strategy (i.e., exclusion motives). What is for certain, however, is 
that it can no longer be argued that the informal sector is either purely a necessitydriven 
realm for excluded populations or that it is purely a result of a desire to exit a burdensome and 
overregulated formal sector. 
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Table 1. Table 1 Reasons European workers engage in the informal economy: by EU region 
(N = 1,048) 
Region 
 Motives (%) 
 Exit  Exclusion   Mixed 
EU28  45  24  31 
EastCentral Europe  41  26  33 
Western Europe  55  15  30 
Southern Europe  22  43  35 
Nordic nations  68  10  22 
Note: We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is 
available. 
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Table 2. Logistic regression of the odds and reasons for participating in the informal sector in the European Union 
 
Undeclared work 
Motives: 
  Exit  Exclusion  Mixed 
β  se(β) Exp(β)  β  se(β) Exp(β)  β  se(β) Exp(β)  β  se(β) Exp(β) 
Tax morality 0.368 *** 0.019 1.445  0.034  0.037 1.034  0.070  0.052 0.933  0.023  0.027 1.023 
Gender (Female)                    
Male 0.719 *** 0.115 2.053  0.229  0.181 1.257  0.040  0.177 0.961  0.225  0.152 0.798 
Age (exact age) 0.025 *** 0.005 0.975  0.005  0.011 1.005  0.001  0.009 1.001  0.005  0.009 0.995 
Marital status ([Re]Married)                    
Single with partner 0.176  0.137 1.193  0.503 ** 0.232 0.605  0.068  0.282 0.934  0.573 ** 0.262 1.773 
Single 0.041  0.171 0.960  0.209  0.273 0.812  0.034  0.284 1.035  0.253  0.250 1.288 
Divorced/ Separated/ Widowed/ 
Other 
0.161  0.113 1.174  0.076  0.275 0.927  0.110  0.298 1.117  0.034  0.242 1.035 
Occupation (Unemployed)                    
Selfemployed 0.069  0.137 0.934  1.606 *** 0.296 4.984  1.281 *** 0.441 0.278  0.423 * 0.233 0.655 
Managers 0.690 *** 0.206 0.502  2.607 *** 0.380 13.56  1.383 *** 0.521 0.251  1.646 *** 0.245 0.193 
Other white collars 0.762 *** 0.209 0.467  1.992 *** 0.339 7.332  1.399 *** 0.462 0.247  0.847 *** 0.291 0.429 
Manual workers 0.543 *** 0.121 0.581  2.074 *** 0.293 7.955  0.946 *** 0.247 0.388  1.169 *** 0.214 0.311 
House persons 0.440 *** 0.170 0.644  0.801 ** 0.401 2.228  0.100  0.290 0.905  0.425  0.259 0.654 
Retired 1.083 *** 0.175 0.339  1.291 *** 0.333 3.635  0.514  0.337 0.598  0.614 * 0.372 0.541 
Students 0.530 *** 0.201 0.589  1.720 *** 0.407 5.585  0.482  0.362 0.617  1.051 *** 0.335 0.350 
Difficulties paying bills (Most of the time)                   
From time to time 0.547 *** 0.099 0.579  0.214  0.210 1.238  0.005  0.238 1.005  0.169  0.203 0.844 
Almost never/ never 0.868 *** 0.155 0.420  0.995 *** 0.214 2.705  0.338  0.286 0.713  0.833 *** 0.233 0.435 
People 15+ years in own household (One)                   
Two 0.307 ** 0.131 0.735  0.109  0.220 1.115  0.085  0.251 0.918  0.027  0.201 0.973 
Three or more 0.253 ** 0.122 0.776  0.012  0.247 0.988  0.083  0.244 0.920  0.114  0.251 1.121 
Children (No children)                    
Having children 0.104  0.097 0.901  0.139  0.176 1.149  0.165  0.293 1.180  0.282  0.207 0.754 
Area (Rural area or village)                    
Small or middle sized town 0.151  0.096 0.860  0.151  0.193 1.163  0.133  0.218 0.876  0.049  0.186 0.952 
Large town 0.195 * 0.108 0.823  0.314  0.207 1.369  0.264  0.208 0.768  0.127  0.208 0.881 
Region (EastCentral Europe)                    
Western Europe 0.088  0.262 0.916  0.051  0.269 0.950  0.400  0.309 0.671  0.327  0.271 1.387 
Southern Europe 0.801 *** 0.281 0.449  0.515 * 0.272 0.598  0.633 * 0.331 1.883  0.216  0.266 0.806 
Nordic nations 0.728 ** 0.338 2.071  0.550 ** 0.263 1.734  1.075 *** 0.311 0.341  0.031  0.285 0.969 
Constant 1.970 *** 0.358 0.139  2.522 *** 0.617 0.080  0.238  0.593 0.788  0.372  0.535 1.451 
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N 24,699  1,048  1,048  1,048 
Pseudo R2 0.1552  0.1708  0.0901  0.0808 
Log pseudolikelihood 3663.7412  602.3078  463.5027  594.2514 
χ
2
 17210.12  1780.54  419.88  1260.49 
p> 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
5
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust standard errors in parentheses). All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. We kept in 
the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is available. When the models are ran without clustering the individuals by country, the 
direction of the associations and the significances do not change for the independent variables discussed in the paper (with p<0.05 or p <0.01). 
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Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition 
Mode or mean Min/ 
Max N = 24,699 N = 1,048 
	
	     
Supply of undeclared 
work      
Dummy variable of undeclared paid 
activities carry out in the last 12 months, 
apart from a regular employment 
Not engaged in 
undeclared work 
(96,6%) 
 0 / 1 
Exit            Dummy variable of “exit” motive which led 
to undeclared paid activities 
 >? not 
mentioned (54%) 
0 / 1 
Exclusion               Dummy variable of “exclusion” motive 
which led to undeclared paid activities 
 >	?
not mentioned 
(76%) 
0 / 1 
Mixed               Dummy variable of “mixed” motives which 
led to undeclared paid activities 
 >
? 
not mentioned 
(69%) 
0 / 1 
 	
	
	

    
Tax morality Constructed index of selfreported tolerance 
towards tax noncompliance 
2.3 3.6 1 / 10 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Female (52%) Male (61%) 0 / 1 
Age  Respondent exact age 47 years 36 years 15 / 98 
15 / 91 
Marital status Respondent marital status in categories (Re)Married/ 
(53%) 
Single (34%) 1 / 4 
Occupation Respondent occupation in categories Retired (25%) Manual workers 
(24%) 
1 / 8 
Difficulties paying 
bills 
Respondent difficulties in paying bills in 
categories 
Almost never/ never 
(60%) 
Almost never/ 
never (41%) 
1 / 3 
People 15+ years in 
own household 
People 15+ years in respondent`s household 
(including the respondent) in categories 
Two (48%) Three or more 
(38%) 
1 / 3 
Children Dummy for the presence of children (up to 
14 years old) in the household 
No children (72%) No children (67%) 0 / 1 
Area Size of the area where the respondent lives 
in categories 
Small or middle 
sized town (41%) 
Small or middle 
sized town (39%) 
1 / 3 
Region Region where the respondent lives in 
categories 
Western Europe 
(49%) 
Western Europe 
(46%) 
1 / 4 
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